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Abstract
We introduce a class of finite-horizon dynamic optimization problems that we call multi-
action stochastic dynamic programs (DPs). Their distinguishing feature is that the decision
in each state is a multi-dimensional vector. These problems can in principle be solved using
Bellman’s backward recursion. However, complexity of this procedure grows exponentially in
the dimension of the decision vectors. This is called the curse of action-space dimensionality. To
overcome this computational challenge, we propose an approximation algorithm rooted in the
game theoretic paradigm of Sampled Fictitious Play (SFP). SFP solves a sequence of DPs with
a one-dimensional action-space, which are exponentially smaller than the original multi-action
stochastic DP. In particular, the computational effort in a fixed number of SFP iterations is
linear in the dimension of the decision vectors. We show that the sequence of SFP iterates
converges to a local optimum, and present a numerical case study in manufacturing where SFP
is able to find solutions with objective values within 1% of the optimal objective value hundreds
of times faster than the time taken by backward recursion. In this case study, SFP solutions
are also better by a statistically significant margin than those found by a one-step lookahead
heuristic.
∗Corresponding author. Industrial and Systems Engineering, Box 352650, The University of Washington, Seattle,
WA 98195. Email: archis@uw.edu.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following class of finite-horizon stochastic dynamic programs (DPs). At the beginning
of periods t = 1, 2, . . . , T , a decision-maker observes the state st ∈ St of a system, where St
are non-empty and finite sets with cardinality |St|. He then chooses an n-dimensional decision
vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , an), for some n > 1, where ai ∈ Ai(st), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Here, Ai(st)
are non-empty and finite sets that may depend on st; we define A(st) as the Cartesian product
A1(st) × A2(st) . . . × An(st). The system then transitions into state st+1 ∈ St+1 with probability
pt(st+1; st, a), and accrues expected reward rt(st, a). The goal is to choose decisions that maximize
the total T -period expected reward starting in initial state s1 (thus S1 is a singleton). We term
these problems unconstrained multi-action stochastic DPs because (i) the decision vectors are
multi-dimensional, and (ii) the decision vector in each state belongs to a Cartesian product of
finite sets and thus do not have cross-component linking constraints. More generally, the reader
can also imagine constrained multi-action stochastic DPs, where the decision vectors must satisfy
cross-component coupling constraints and hence belong to a subset F (st) of the Cartesian product
A(st). We implicitly assume that sets St do not depend on n, and in particular that they are
“small.” Thus, as we shall see in Section 2, the dimension n of the decision vectors is what makes
the problem difficult, and this is the type of problems for which our methodology is particularly
suitable. Multi-action stochastic DPs provide a natural modeling framework for several sequential
decision problems. A few prototypical examples are discussed next.
1.1 Applications of multi-action stochastic dynamic programs
First consider a basic dynamic resource allocation problem where a known set of heterogeneous
activities can be performed in each time-period. A random additional amount of one resource
becomes available at the beginning of every time-period. The resource is necessary for performing
any activity. Each activity can be performed at a finite number of different levels. The resource
consumed by an activity as well as the expected reward obtained from that activity depend on
the level at which the activity is performed. The decision maker chooses the activity levels at
the beginning of every period after observing the available resource; the resource remaining after
allocation can be carried forward to the next period perhaps by incurring an inventory holding cost.
2
Reward functions and cost functions may vary across time-periods. The goal is to maximize the
total finite-horizon expected net reward. The economic tradeoff is between immediately spending
the resource on activities that appear valuable versus saving some of the resource, incurring holding
costs in some cases, with the hope that it can be utilized for higher rewards in the future.
This dynamic resource allocation problem is a constrained multi-action stochastic DP and its
detailed formulation is given in Appendix A. The dimension n of the decision vectors equals the
total number of activity types. The state corresponds to the amount of resource available at the
beginning of a period. The set of feasible decision vectors is defined by the constraint that the
total amount of resource consumed by all activities cannot exceed the amount of resource that
is available. Through a simple transformation that we describe in Appendix A, this constrained
multi-action stochastic DP can in fact be converted to an unconstrained multi-action stochastic
DP.
An appropriately modified version of the dynamic resource allocation problem, where the re-
source corresponds to the wealth of an investor and the activities correspond to different financial
assets, leads to a well-known class of dynamic portfolio optimization problems [13] that can be
formulated as multi-action stochastic DPs.
The following dynamic pricing problem [19] is also closely related to the dynamic resource
allocation problem and can be modeled as a multi-action stochastic DP. A firm is endowed with a
fixed initial quantity of a resource that can be used for providing different services from a fixed set
of possible services. The resource cannot be replenished over the problem horizon. Each service
offered consumes a fixed quantity of the resource. In each period, after observing the amount of
available resource, the firm decides which services to offer, and what the corresponding prices should
be. These prices induce a random demand for the services thus generating a random revenue. The
goal is to maximize the total expected revenue over the problem horizon.
Another variation where the resource corresponds to a raw material such as crude oil, and the
activities correspond to different end products such as different refined fractions [15], leads to a
dynamic resource procurement and product-mix problem. In that case, the raw material does not
randomly arrive but must be purchased at a price that itself may be assumed to follow a suitable
stochastic process hence requiring an appropriate modification of the state definition. Moreover,
the amount of resource purchased also becomes a decision variable. This problem can also be
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formulated as a multi-action stochastic DP.
The dynamic pricing and the dynamic resource procurement and product-mix problems possess
a structural feature that often arises in manufacturing and service operations management. In
particular, in these problems, different kinds of decisions need to be made in each time-period: in
the dynamic pricing problem, service types as well as prices need to be chosen; in the dynamic re-
source procurement and product-mix problem, a resource procurement strategy as well as product
types must be selected. Such heterogeneous decisions were traditionally optimized separately in
a hierarchical manner. However, the more recent trend in the operations management literature
is toward an integrated view where decisions at strategic, tactical and operational decisions are
optimized in a single optimization model. Examples include integrated decision models for simul-
taneous pricing and production/inventory decisions [6, 9] and jointly optimizing dynamic pricing
and sequencing policies for multi-product, single-server queuing systems [18]. Such integrated de-
cision problems can be formulated as multi-action stochastic DPs, and in fact, the manufacturing
application presented in Section 5 exhibits this feature.
We next describe the key computational challenge in solving multi-action stochastic DPs.
2 Computational difficulties in finding an exact solution
For simplicity of exposition, we focus in this and the next two sections on unconstrained multi-
action stochastic DPs. As demonstrated in Appendix A for the special case of dynamic resource
allocation problems and also in our manufacturing case study in Section 5, a constrained mutli-
action stochastic DP can be converted into an equivalent, unconstrained one by mapping infeasible
solutions into feasible solutions. Consequently, the ideas developed here continue to apply to
constrained multi-action stochastic DPs as well. (As long as one feasible solution to the constrained
multi-action stochastic DP is known, such a transformation is always possible by mapping all
infeasible solutions to this single feasible solution.)
First, we recall standard terminology from DP (see [1, 23, 24, 26]). A (Markovian deter-
ministic) policy pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , piT ) is a mapping that assigns n-dimensional decision vector
pit(st) = (pi1t(st), pi2t(st), . . . , pint(st)) ∈ A(st) to state st ∈ St in period t. The set of all such
policies is denoted by Π. Let Vpi(s1) denote the total T -period expected reward obtained by imple-
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menting policy pi starting in initial state s1. It is given by
Vpi(s1) , Epi
[ T∑
t=1
rt(Zt, pit(Zt))
∣∣∣∣Z1 = s1], (1)
where Z2, . . . , ZT are the random states occupied beginning periods 2, . . . , T , respectively, given
that the initial state Z1 is s1 and policy pi is implemented.
There exists a policy in Π that maximizes the total T -period expected reward among all decision
rules. Thus a policy is said to be optimal if it maximizes Vpi(s1) over all pi ∈ Π. The decision-maker’s
problem is hence given by
V1(s1) , max
pi∈Π
Vpi(s1). (2)
More generally, let Vt(st) denote the maximum total expected reward in periods t, . . . , T when
starting period t in state st. Problem (2) can in principle be solved using Bellman’s equations
Vt(st) = max
a∈A(st)
{
rt(st, a) +
∑
st+1∈St+1
pt(st+1; st, a)Vt+1(st+1)
}
∀st ∈ St, (3)
in the order t = T, . . . , 1, where VT+1(sT+1) = 0 for all sT+1 ∈ ST+1. Decisions that achieve the
above maxima define an optimal policy in Π.
If cardinality |Ai(st)| = M for each i, then cardinality |A(st)| = Mn. Thus the computational
effort required to perform one maximization in (3) grows exponentially with n . This is called the
curse of action-space dimensionality [23] and it makes exact solution of a multi-action stochastic
DP intractable. We propose an approximation algorithm rooted in a game theoretic best response
paradigm called Sampled Fictitious Play (SFP) [16]. As we shall see, n DPs, each with a one-
dimensional action-space, are solved in each iteration of SFP and hence the computational effort in
one iteration grows linearly with n. We will prove that SFP converges to locally optimal solutions
of the multi-action stochastic DP, and will demonstrate through numerical results that SFP can
obtain high-quality solutions very quickly. In order to make some of these ideas rigorous, we need
to view the original multi-action stochastic DP as an equivalent game of common interests between
n players as described next.
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3 An equivalent game of common interests
We view an unconstrained multi-action stochastic DP as a game of common interests in which player
i corresponds to the ith component of the decision vector. A pure strategy ψi = (ψi1, . . . , ψiT ) for
player i is a mapping that prescribes decisions ψit(st) ∈ Ai(st) in every state st ∈ St in every period
t. Let Ψi denote the non-empty and finite set of all such pure strategies for player i. A pure joint
strategy for all players is given by ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn). The set of all such pure joint strategies is
denoted by Ψ = Ψ1 × Ψ2 × . . . × Ψn. Each ψ ∈ Ψ defines a unique policy pi ∈ Π that prescribes
the decision vector pit(st) = (ψ1t(st), ψ2t(st), . . . , ψnt(st)) in state st in period t. We express this
one-to-one relationship between pure joint strategies in Ψ and policies in Π by using an operator
O : Ψ → Π. Note that for every policy pi ∈ Π, there exists a (unique) pure joint strategy ψ ∈ Ψ
such that O(ψ) = pi. In particular, this ψ is precisely the pure joint strategy in which player i’s
pure strategy prescribes decision piit(st) in state st in period t, that is, ψit(st) = piit(st). That
is, O is onto. The identical payoff U(ψ) received by each player on playing pure joint strategy
ψ is defined as the total T -period expected reward obtained by implementing policy O(ψ) ∈ Π.
Mathematically,
U(ψ) , VO(ψ)(s1), (4)
for all ψ ∈ Ψ. The players then solve a game of common interests given by
max
ψ∈Ψ
U(ψ). (5)
This game has previously been called a common interest stochastic game, or a team Markov game
(see, for example, [2]). We have
Lemma 3.1. If ψ ∈ Ψ is optimal to (5), then O(ψ) is optimal to (2).
Proof. We have U(ψ) ≥ U(ξ) for all ξ ∈ Ψ. Thus (4) implies that VO(ψ)(s1) ≥ VO(ξ)(s1) for
all ξ ∈ Ψ. This proves the claim because O is onto as explained in the first paragraph in this
section.
We now review basic concepts from game theory (see [10]) and establish that Nash equilibria
of (5) are locally optimal for (2). We use ψ−i to denote pure strategies (ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, ψi+1, . . . , ψn)
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of all players except player i (subscript −i is interpreted similarly everywhere). For µi ∈ Ψi and
ψ ∈ Ψ, (µi, ψ−i) denotes the pure joint strategy in which player i plays µi and the others play ψ−i.
Definition 3.2. A pure joint strategy ψ ∈ Ψ is a Nash equilibrium for (5) if, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
U(ψ) ≥ U(µi, ψ−i), ∀µi ∈ Ψi. (6)
That is, if no player can increase the payoff to all players by unilaterally altering its own pure
strategy.
An optimal pure joint strategy for (5) is a Nash equilibrium for (5). Conversely, a pure joint
strategy Nash equilibrium for (5) can be seen as a local optimum for (5) because moving away
from a Nash equilibrium along any of the “coordinate directions” does not improve the common
objective. Formally, let N (ψ) , {(µi, ψ−i) : µi ∈ Ψi, for some i} be a neighborhood of ψ ∈ Ψ, and
note that (6) can be written as U(ψ) ≥ U(µ) for all µ ∈ N (ψ).
Lemma 3.3. If ψ is a pure joint strategy Nash equilibrium for (5), then O(ψ) is locally optimal
for (2) in the sense that VO(ψ)(s1) ≥ VO(µ)(s1) for all µ ∈ N (ψ).
Proof. We have, VO(ψ)(s1) = U(ψ) ≥ U(µ) = VO(µ)(s1) for all µ ∈ N(ψ), by (4) and since ψ is a
Nash equilibrium.
Thus, although the concept of local optimality has not been used in the published approximate
dynamic programming literature to the best of our knowledge (see, however, a recent doctoral
dissertation on near-optimality in sequential decision problems [27]), in the context of multi-action
stochastic DPs it is identical to the notion of local optimality in static optimization — a solution
is locally optimal if it has the best objective value in its neighborhood.
We define the set ∆i of all mixed strategies for player i as ∆i ,
{
fi : Ψi → [0, 1] :
∑
ψi∈Ψi
fi(ψi) =
1
}
. Each fi ∈ ∆i can be viewed as an assignment of probabilities, or beliefs, to the elements of Ψi.
We identify pure strategies ψi ∈ Ψi as members of ∆i that assign probability 1 to ψi. We define
∆ , ∆1 ×∆2 × · · ·∆n and an f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) ∈ ∆ is called a mixed joint strategy. Note that
the set ∆ can be viewed as belonging to a Euclidean space. We extend the domain of the payoff
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function U such that for any mixed joint strategy f ∈ ∆, we have,
U(f) ,
∑
ψ∈Ψ
U(ψ)f(ψ) =
∑
ψ∈Ψ
U(ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn)f1(ψ1)f2(ψ2) · · · fn(ψn). (7)
We interpret this U(f) as the expected payoff to all players when they independently choose pure
strategies with probabilities defined by f = (f1, . . . , fn). We now establish a relation between mixed
joint strategies and a class of randomized decision rules for the multi-action stochastic DP.
We define a set Φ of randomized decision rules for the multi-action stochastic DP as Φ ,
{
φ :
Π→ [0, 1] : ∑
pi∈Π
φ(pi) = 1
}
. That is, φ chooses Markovian deterministic policies pi with probabilities
φ(pi). The total T -period expected reward accrued by a randomized decision rule φ ∈ Φ is given by
Vφ(s1) ,
∑
pi∈Π
Vpi(s1)φ(pi). (8)
A mixed joint strategy f ∈ ∆ defines a unique randomized decision rule denoted Θ(f) ∈ Φ, which
chooses policies O(ψ) with probabilities f(ψ) for all ψ ∈ Ψ. This yields
U(f) =
∑
ψ∈Ψ
U(ψ)f(ψ) =
∑
ψ∈Ψ
VO(ψ)(s1)f(ψ) =
∑
pi∈Π
Vpi(s1)[Θ(f)(pi)] = VΘ(f)(s1), (9)
where the third equality holds because O is bijective and f(ψ) is the same as Θ(f)(pi) for pi = O(ψ).
Definition 3.4. A mixed joint strategy f ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium, if for each player i,
U(f) ≥ U(gi, f−i) ∀gi ∈ ∆i. (10)
That is, if no player can increase the payoff to all players by altering its own mixed strategy.
For any f ∈ ∆, its neighborhood M(f) , {(gi, f−i) : gi ∈ ∆i, for some i}. Then (10) can be
written as U(f) ≥ U(g) for all g ∈M(f). This yields the following counterpart of Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.5. If f ∈ ∆ is a mixed joint strategy Nash equilibrium then the randomized decision rule
Θ(f) ∈ Φ is locally optimal for (2) in the sense that VΘ(f)(s1) ≥ VΘ(g)(s1) for all g ∈M(f).
Proof. By (9) and since f is a Nash equilibrium, VΘ(f)(s1) = U(f) ≥ U(g) = VΘ(g)(s1) ∀g ∈
M(f).
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Thus any efficient algorithm for finding Nash equilibria of (5) will efficiently discover locally
optimal solutions of (2). We chose SFP [16], which in turn is based on fictitious play (FP) [3, 22, 25],
for this purpose. This choice was motivated by (i) the high quality of solutions delivered by
variants of FP in other discrete optimization problems [4, 7, 8, 12, 17]; (ii) previous evidence that
the sampling process in SFP provides a good tradeoff between exploitation and exploration of
the solution space [7, 8]; (iii) SFP’s asymptotic convergence to equilibrium for games of common
interests [16]; (iv) the fact, as we shall show, that SFP in every iteration solves n DPs, each with
a one-dimensional action-space, instead of the original intractable n-dimensional DP; and (v) the
ease with which SFP can be parallelized (see [7]) across the n components of the decision vectors,
achieving a further n-fold reduction in wall-clock time needed.
4 Sampled fictitious play
Fictitious play [3, 25] was originally proposed to find Nash equilibria of two-player games and was
later extended to n-player games [22]. In each iteration of FP, each player computes a pure strategy
best response assuming that the other players will play according to the mixed strategy defined by
their empirical frequency of past best responses. The empirical frequencies are then updated with
these new best responses. For games of common interests, the sequence of empirical frequencies
converges to equilibrium in the following sense. For every δ > 0, there exists an iteration counter κ
such that each empirical frequency in all iterations k ≥ κ is within a Euclidean distance δ from some
(possibly mixed joint strategy) Nash equilibrium. See [16, 22] for a proof of this result. However,
a straightforward implementation of FP is impractical when the sets of pure strategies are large.
This is because each player’s best response requires a computationally demanding calculation of
that player’s expected payoff given the other players’ mixed strategies. SFP [16] overcomes this
hurdle by approximating this expectation with a sample average (Steps 2(a), (b) below) and still
retains convergence to equilibrium (Theorem 4.2 below) as in FP.
We now present SFP for the game of common interests from Section 3. We let fk denote the
empirical frequency of best responses of all players in the first k iterations. Formally, for any player
i and any pure strategy ψi ∈ Ψi, fki (ψi) equals the proportion of iterations, out of k, in which pure
strategy ψi was player i’s best response. Thus fki is a probability mass function over Ψi and hence
9
belongs to ∆i. Moreover, fk = (fk1 , f
k
2 , . . . , f
k
n) belongs to ∆ and hence is a mixed joint strategy.
Algorithm 4.1 (Sampled Fictitious Play).
1. Initialization: Set iteration k = 1 and select ψ0 ∈ Ψ = Ψ1 ×Ψ2 × . . .×Ψn arbitrarily; set
f0i (ψ
0
i ) = 1 for all players i, and f
0
i (ξi) = 0 for all players i and all ξi ∈ Ψi such that ξi 6= ψ0i .
2. Iteration k ≥ 1:
(a) Sampling: Select a sample size Nk ≥ 1, and draw an iid pure strategy sample ψjki , for
j = 1, . . . , Nk, from the probability distributions fk−1i , for each player i.
(b) Best response: For each player i, find a pure strategy best response to the sample ψjk−i,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , Nk, drawn by the other players, by solving
ψki ∈ argmax
ψi∈Ψi

Nk∑
j=1
U(ψi, ψ
jk
−i)
Nk
 . (11)
(c) Belief update: Update empirical frequencies of best responses for each player i by
setting
fki (ψ
k
i ) =
1 + (k − 1)fk−1i (ψki )
k
,
fki (ξi) =
(k − 1)fk−1i (ξi)
k
for ξi ∈ Ψi, ξi 6= ψki .
Increment k by 1 and go to the next iteration.
The following theorem is proven in [16] for a general common interest game.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose sample sizes Nk =
⌈
Ckβ
⌉
for some β > 12 and C > 0. Then, with
probability 1, the sequence {fk}∞k=1 converges to equilibrium in the sense described above.
Corollary 4.3. Suppose sample sizes Nk =
⌈
Ckβ
⌉
for some β > 12 and C > 0. Then, with
probability 1, the sequence {Θ(fk)}∞k=1 of randomized decision rules converges to local optima for
the multi-action stochastic DP.
We now make a few observations that render this algorithm particularly easy to implement.
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Efficient sampling: It is not necessary to explicitly maintain and update empirical frequencies
fk as this would be computationally demanding. Instead, each player only maintains and updates
a history of its own best responses. The sampling in Step 2(a) for player i then simply involves
sampling Nk iteration counters, that is, integers from the set {1, 2, . . . , k−1}, with equal probability.
The pure strategies stored at those locations in the history of best responses for player i then form
the sample ψjki , for j = 1, 2, . . . , Nk. This process is probabilistically equivalent to sampling policies
according to fk−1i .
Samples of size one: For computational efficiency, we use Nk = 1 for all k rather than in-
creasing Nk at a rate that guarantees convergence as per Theorem 4.2. SFP with samples of size
one has been implemented previously on traffic signal control problems [7] and DPs that arise in
stochastic inventory control problems [8], producing good solutions in both cases. We consider this
modification to be in line with a similar practice in other stochastic search methods. For example,
in Simulated Annealing [14], the temperature parameter should be decreased slowly with iterations
in order to guarantee convergence to optimality, however, in practice, the temperature is reduced
much faster. Samples of size one simplify the best response problem (11) significantly as described
next.
Best response problem (11) is a DP with a one-dimensional action-space: Suppose
Nk = 1, and let ξk ∈ Ψ be the pure joint strategy sampled in iteration k. Then problem (11) for
player i reduces to ψki ∈ argmaxψi∈Ψi U(ψi, ξk−i), or in other words, to
ψki ∈ argmax
ψi∈Ψi
VO(ψi,ξk−i)
(s1), (12)
by (4). The above problem is a stochastic DP with a one-dimensional action-space since pure
strategies of all players other than player i are fixed at ξk−i. It can be solved using Bellman’s
equations
V kit (st) , max
ai∈Ai(st)
{
rt(st, (ai, ξk−it(st))) +
∑
st+1∈St+1
pt(st+1; st, (ai, ξk−it(st)))V
k
it+1(st+1)
}
(13)
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for all st ∈ St in the order t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1, starting with V kiT+1(sT+1) = 0 for all sT+1 ∈ ST+1.
The best response strategy ψki in problem (12) is given by decisions that achieve the above maxima,
and the corresponding optimal value VO(ψki ,ξk−i)(s1) equals V
k
i1(s1). This discussion shows that each
iteration of SFP solves n DPs, each with a one-dimensional action-space, instead of solving the
original, intractable n-dimensional DP. Thus the effort expended in k iterations is proportional to
k×M × n. The best response problem is also a DP when Nk > 1 but in the interest of brevity we
defer that discussion to Appendix B.
Algorithm output: As is common in other stochastic search algorithms, we track the best
value attained and the corresponding policy that achieves this value during algorithm execution.
Specifically, the best value attained in iterations 1 through k is given by
V (k) , max
l=1,2,...,k
{
max
i=1,2,...,n
V li1(s1)
}
.
Suppose that V (k) is achieved during the best response calculation for player i∗(k) in iteration
1 ≤ l∗(k) ≤ k. That is, V (k) = V l∗(k)i∗(k)1(s1). Also let ξl
∗(k) be the policy sampled in iteration
l∗(k), and recall that ψl
∗(k)
i∗(k) denotes player i
∗(k)’s best response to ξl
∗(k)
−i∗(k) in this iteration. Then
pi(k) = O
(
ψ
l∗(k)
i∗(k), ξ
l∗(k)
−i∗(k)
)
∈ Π is the best multi-action stochastic DP policy found by Algorithm
4.1 in the first k iterations. Thus, if the algorithm is terminated after K iterations, both V (K) and
pi(K) are available as algorithm output.
5 Application to integrated capital investment, dynamic pricing,
production scheduling and sales decisions in manufacturing
The problem we study in this section was motivated by our industrial collaborators at the General
Motors Advanced Manufacturing Laboratory at the University of Michigan. Consider a manufac-
turing firm that produces units of one product such as computers, cars, airplanes, or clothes. We
model the manufacturing process over a finite planning horizon that is divided into periods of equal
length. At the beginning of the horizon, a strategic decision is made as to what plant capacity to
put in operation. At the beginning of each period, the unit price of the product is determined. This
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induces a random demand for the product during that period through a price-demand function.
The number of units to be produced in that period is decided before observing the realized demand.
We allow for unreliable equipment and hence the plant may not be actually able to produce these
many units. Before observing the realized demand and the realized production, a goal is set as
to how many units should be sold in that period. We assume that extra demand is lost, that is,
back-ordering is not allowed. The units remaining at the end of a period can be carried to the next
period as inventory and used to satisfy the demand in that and subsequent periods. Inventory left
at the end of the planning horizon is assumed to have no value. The goal is to maximize profit
where revenue is generated by selling the product and costs are incurred for building the plant,
production, and storing inventory.
We use the following notation:
• The planning horizon T is divided into periods of equal duration denoted by the indices
t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
• The finite set of possible integer plant capacities is given by M , {m1,m2, . . . ,m|M|} where
0 < m1 < m2 < . . . < m|M|.
• The cost of building a plant with capacity m ∈M is C(m) incurred every period. Thus the
total cost of building is TC(m). It may seem more natural to incur the building cost as a
single, lump-sum expense. We instead followed the equivalent amortized cost approach to
prevent the building costs from overwhelmingly dominating the profit function in problems
with short planning horizons. Note that any current cash flow can be easily converted into
an equivalent present-value annuity having any desired term. Another reason to allocate
capacity costs by time period is that some fixed costs (heating, cooling, taxes, security, etc.)
are incurred each time period.
• The finite set of possible unit prices in each period is denoted by P.
• We let D , {D1(·), D2(·), . . . , D|D|(·)} be the set of possible price-demand functions. The
demand induced by a particular price p ∈ P is an integer Dk(p) with probability Qk inde-
pendently of everything else.
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• ρ is a random variable independent of everything else that equals the fraction of planned
capacity actually available for production (reliability) in a period. The random variable takes
value lk from a finite set L , {l1, l2, . . . , l|L|} with probability Plk .
• The cost of production depends on the period t, the plant capacity m, the planned production
level x, as well as the realized production xˆ, and is denoted by c(t,m, x, xˆ).
• The cost of carrying an inventory of i units at the beginning of period t is h(t, i). The initial
inventory is zero.
• The number of units planned to be sold at the end of a period is denoted z whereas the
realized sales are denoted zˆ.
5.1 A multi-action stochastic DP formulation
Suppose capacity m ∈M is chosen at the beginning of the planning horizon. For this fixed capacity
value, the state of our manufacturing system beginning period t = 1, 2, . . . , T is given by (t, (i,m)),
where i is the inventory on hand and belongs to the set {0, 1, 2 . . . , (t − 1)m} as (t − 1)m is the
maximum possible total production in periods 1, 2, . . . , t− 1. The set F (t, (i,m)) of jointly feasible
pricing, production, and sales decision vectors (p, x, z) is defined by constraints
p ∈ P (14)
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} (15)
z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i+ x}. (16)
For any nonnegative real number y, let byc denote the largest integer not bigger than y. After
choosing decisions (p, x, z) ∈ F (t, (i,m)), a price-demand function Dj(·) ∈ D and a reliability
lk ∈ L are realized, leading to actual production and sales
xˆ = min{x, blkmc} (17)
zˆ = min{z, i+ xˆ, Dj(p)} = min{z, i+min{x, blkmc}, Dj(p)}. (18)
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Thus the state of the system beginning the next period is (t + 1, (i + xˆ − zˆ,m)) with probability
PlkQj . The expected profit is given by
rt((i,m), (p, x, z)) ,
(∑
lk∈L
∑
Dj(·)∈D
PlkQj
[
pzˆ − C(m)− c(t,m, x, xˆ)− h(t+ 1, i+ xˆ− zˆ)
])
.
A feasible policy pi is a decision rule that assigns price, production and sales decisions (p, x, z) =
(pi1(t, (i,m)), pi2(t, (i,m)), pi3(t, (i,m))) ∈ F (t, (i,m)) to every state (t, (i,m)). The set of all feasible
policies is denoted Π. Then, the total T -period expected profit under policy pi ∈ Π is
Vpi(0,m) = Epi
[
T∑
t=1
rt((It,m), (pi1(t, (It,m)), pi2(t, (It,m)), pi3(t, (It,m))))
∣∣∣∣∣I1 = 0,m
]
,
where I2, I3, . . . is a sequence of inventory levels induced by the policy pi given that the initial
inventory I1 is zero, and the plant capacity is fixed at m ∈M.
As a result, given plant capacity m, we wish to solve
V1(0,m) , max
pi∈Π
Vpi(0,m). (19)
This can in principle be achieved by solving Bellman’s equations
Vt(i,m) , max
(p,x,z)∈F (t,(i,m))
(
rt((i,m), (p, x, z)) +
∑
lk∈L
∑
Dj(·)∈D
PlkQjVt+1(i+ xˆ− zˆ,m)
)
(20)
in the order t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1, where VT+1(i,m) = 0, and xˆ, zˆ are given by (17) and (18),
respectively. Once V1(0,m) is available from (20) for every m ∈ M, the optimal capacity m∗ can
be obtained by enumeration as
m∗ , argmax
m∈M
V1(0,m). (21)
Thus, we first focus on solving (19), which is a multi-action stochastic DP with three-dimensional
decision vectors. As our numerical experiments will show, exact solution of Bellman’s equations
(20) is computationally demanding. We instead apply our game theoretic approximation approach
from Section 4, and demonstrate numerically that it finds near-optimal solutions very quickly.
However, first notice that (19) is not an unconstrained multi-action stochastic DP. This is
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because decisions x and z are linked through constraint (16) and hence the set F (t, (i,m)) of
feasible decision vectors (p, x, z) does not have the Cartesian product structure that is essential
in viewing a multi-action stochastic DP as a game. In the next section, we present a variable
transformation that converts the constrained problem (19) into an unconstrained one and then
describe the resulting game of common interests.
5.2 A variable transformation and a game of common interests
Instead of selecting the planned production directly, we set the planned production to a fraction
of the plant capacity. Similarly, instead of selecting the planned sales directly, we set the planned
sales to a fraction of the inventory that would be available if the planned production is realized.
We do not alter the price decision.
We introduce some notation to make these ideas precise. Let dmax be the maximum demand
that could be observed in a period and d(i) be the maximum possible amount that we could sell in
a period where the inventory on hand is i, that is,
dmax , max
Dj(·)∈D
Dj(min{P}),
d(i) , min
{
dmax, i+m|M|
}
.
We define sets
B1(t, (i,m)) , P, (22)
B2(t, (i,m)) ,
{
0,
1
m|M|
,
2
m|M|
, . . . , 1
}
, and (23)
B3(t, (i,m)) ,
{
0,
1
d(i)
,
2
d(i)
, . . . , 1
}
, (24)
and let B(t, (i,m)) = B1(t, (i,m)) × B2(t, (i,m)) × B3(t, (i,m)). This particular definition of sets
B2 and B3 ensures that they have sufficient “resolution” such that the subsequent transformation
of joint strategies to feasible policies is onto. Now consider a game between three players, indexed
1, 2, 3, which we call the revenue management (RM) player, the production planning (PP) player,
and the sales (S) player, respectively. Pure strategy ψ1 of RM is a mapping that assigns prices
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ψ1(t, (i,m)) ∈ B1(t, (i,m)) to all possible inventories i and all periods t (recall that plant capacity
m is fixed while solving (19)). Similarly, pure strategy ψ2 of PP is a mapping that assigns frac-
tions ψ2(t, (i,m)) ∈ B2(t, (i,m)), and pure strategy ψ3 of S is a mapping that assigns fractions
ψ3(t, (i,m)) ∈ B3(t, (i,m)) to all i and t. The finite sets of pure strategies of RM, PP, and S are
denoted by Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, respectively, and Ψ , Ψ1×Ψ2×Ψ3 denotes the finite set of their pure joint
strategies ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, ψ3).
Each pure strategy ψ ∈ Ψ defines a unique policy pi = O(ψ) ∈ Π, which assigns feasible decision
vectors (p, x, z) = (pi1(t, (i,m)), pi2(t, (i,m)), pi3(t, (i,m))) ∈ F (t, (i,m)) to all i and t, where
p = ψ1(t, (i,m)), (25)
x = bmψ2(t, (i,m))c, (26)
z = bψ3(t, (i,m)) (i+ bmψ2(t, (i,m))c)c. (27)
After the demand function Dj(·) ∈ D and reliability lk ∈ L are realized, the production and sales
are given by (17) and (18), respectively. Also note that corresponding to every pi ∈ Π, there is at
least one ψ ∈ Ψ, such that O(ψ) = pi. That is, O : Ψ → Π is an onto transformation. Finally, on
choosing pure joint strategy ψ ∈ Ψ, RM, PP, and S, receive a common payoff
Um(ψ) , VO(ψ)(0,m), (28)
where the superscript m emphasizes that the plant capacity is fixed at m. This completes our
definition of a game of common interests between RM, PP, and S, and Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 hold.
In fact, after defining mixed strategies for these three players, it is easy to see, by following the
reasoning in Section 3, that Lemma 3.5 will hold as well. We do not repeat the details here for
brevity. Now we are ready to describe our implementation of the SFP algorithm on this game of
common interests.
5.3 Description of algorithm implementation
For each m ∈M, we implemented the simplified version of SFP with efficiently drawn samples of
size one as described after Algorithm 4.1. Here we present the stochastic DPs that arose in the
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best response problems for the RM, PP, and S players. To be precise, sampled strategies and best
response strategies should be indexed by this fixed value of m in the discussion below; however, we
suppress this for simplicity.
Let ξki , for i = 1, 2, 3, denote the pure strategy sampled in iteration k by the RM, PP, and S
players, respectively. Then the best response problems of these three players are respectively given
by
ψk1 ∈ argmax
ψ1∈Ψ1
Um(ψ1, ξk2 , ξ
k
3 ) (29)
ψk2 ∈ argmax
ψ2∈Ψ2
Um(ξk1 , ψ2, ξ
k
3 ) (30)
ψk3 ∈ argmax
ψ3∈Ψ3
Um(ξk1 , ξ
k
2 , ψ3). (31)
As described in Section 4, these three best response problems can be formulated as DPs. Fol-
lowing the notation in (13) we denote the optimal values in these three DPs by V k11(0,m), V
k
21(0,m),
and V k31(0,m), respectively. Suppose that for every m ∈ M the algorithm is terminated after K
iterations. As is common in stochastic search algorithms, K can be chosen after some initial exper-
imentation as roughly the iteration counter where the algorithm stopped making significant gains
in objective value. We then propose the following method to obtain a plant capacity, and an inte-
grated price, production and sales policy for the original multi-action stochastic DP. As described
in Section 4, we tracked the best value found by our SFP algorithm. In particular, at the end of
K iterations with capacity m, we have,
V (K;m) , max
k=1,2,...,K
{
V k11(0,m), V
k
21(0,m), V
k
31(0,m)
}
. (32)
Suppose that the best value V (K;m) is achieved during player i’s best response calculation in the
kth iteration. That is, V (K;m) = V ki1(0,m) for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and some 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Let
pim = O(ψki , ξ
k
−i) be the multi-action stochastic DP policy in Π that achieved this value. The best
plant capacity was then found using the approximate version
m¯ ∈ argmax
m∈M
V (K;m) (33)
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of enumeration (21). The price, production, and sales policy is thus given by pim¯, and the corre-
sponding objective value by V (K; m¯).
5.4 Problem data and results of numerical experiments
5.4.1 Problem data
The model in Section 5.1 requires data on plant building costs, stochastic price-demand functions,
production costs, inventory costs, and plant reliability. The general trend in some of these data as
plotted in Figure 1 was obtained from our collaborators at the General Motors Advanced Manu-
facturing Laboratory at the University of Michigan. The actual numbers shown in this figure have
been distorted for confidentiality. Specifically,
• The planning horizon was T = 15 periods, where each period corresponds to one year. We
repeated our experiments with T = 5 and T = 10 and found no difference in SFP performance.
• There were 33 possible plant capacities (|M| = 33), ranging from yearly capacity of 20,000 to
120,000 units.
• The set P included 813 prices in the range $13,500 to $27,500.
• We assumed a constant elasticity demand function [29] of the form D(p) = eαpβ. In order to
introduce stochasticity, we parameterized demand functions Di(·) in the set D by parameters
αi and βi. In particular, we included three possible demand functions that indicate low
demand, normal demand, and high demand. Fitting the data provided to us, this led to
(αi, βi) ∈ {(48.5573,−4.5076), (49.0478,−4.5076), (49.5383,−4.5076)}. Note that the lower
the price, the higher the demand owing to the negative value of parameter βi. In each
period, the actual realized demand was chosen from one of these three functions with equal
probability. We repeated our experiments with non-uniform probability mass functions and
found no difference in SFP performance.
• The variable production cost (including both labor and material cost) was assumed to be
linear in the number of vehicles produced. Specifically, the variable production cost per
vehicle was assumed to decrease with increasing plant capacity due to economies of scale as
shown in Figure 1 and stationary across time periods.
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• The inventory holding cost per vehicle was assumed to be 20 percent of the unit variable
production cost in that period.
• The plant reliability value ρ was assumed to be an element of the set
L = {0.6, 0.66, 0.7, 0.74, 0.8}.
One of these values was selected with equal probability in each period. Again, we repeated our
numerical experiments with non-uniform probability mass functions and found no difference
in SFP performance.
5.4.2 Numerical results
The numerical experiments were run on a computing cluster equipped with Intel Xeon 5400 series
processors. The operating system was a variant of RedHat Enterprise Linux. The code was written
in C++. The number of iterations K was set to 20 because the algorithm was empirically observed
to stop making significant progress in objective value thereafter.
First, standard backward recursion was employed to solve Bellman’s equations (20) for each of
the thirty three values of m ∈M. These thirty three implementations of backward recursion were
done in parallel . The time required for backward recursion depends on plant capacitym: the higher
the capacity, higher the time required. Thus, the time taken to complete backward recursion for the
largest capacity m=120,000 is reported in Table 1. Problem (21) can then be solved in negligible
time to obtain an optimal plant capacity, an optimal pricing, production and sales policy, and the
corresponding optimal objective value.
Since we have thirty three different capacities in M, thirty three runs of our algorithm — each
corresponding to one of these capacity values — were performed in parallel . Recall that the run
corresponding to capacity m ∈M yields V (20;m) and pim on termination as described at the end
of Section 5.2. Problem (33) was then solved easily to obtain a capacity m¯, a pricing, production
and sales policy pim¯, and the corresponding objective value V (20; m¯). In fact, sixty independent
runs of this entire procedure were performed with randomly generated initial pure strategies and
the approximate optimal values obtained at the end of these runs were averaged. The average
20
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Figure 1: (a) Production line building cost, paid by period, as a function of capacity. The shape
of the curve reflects the intuition that there is a capacity threshold below which a fully automated
production line does not make sense; automation is essential above this threshold. (b) Demand as
a function of price. (c) Variable production cost per vehicle as a function of capacity.
computation time required to complete the SFP procedure for the largest capacity m=120,000 is
given in Table 1.
Algorithm Execution time for m=120,000 Value estimate ratio
(relative to the optimal value)
Backward Recursion 20.6 hours (1240 minutes) 1.0
SFP 5.4 minutes (averaged over 60 runs) 0.99
Table 1: Performance comparison between exact backward recursion and our SFP solver
From Table 1, we see that the SFP solver on average found objective values within 1% of the
optimal objective value in only about 5 minutes. On the other hand, exact backward recursion
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takes about 20 hours of CPU time (about 227 times slower than our SFP solver). The progress of
the SFP solver over twenty iterations is illustrated in Figure 2. The standard practice in sampling
based algorithms for DP, and more generally, for global optimization, is to plot average algorithm
performance over independent runs versus iterations (see for example [5, 28]). Following this
approach, we track the best value observed by SFP as a fraction of the optimal value, and plot its
average over sixty independent runs. We observe that the SFP solver makes most improvements
during early iterations (the average fraction climbs to about 0.95 in just 5 iterations), and despite
having large variation during the early iterations (due to randomly generated initial solutions), the
ratio converges quickly later on. The range of fractions at the 20th iteration was only [0.972, 0.999],
with an average of 0.99. Thus even in the worst case (out of the sixty random instances of initial
solutions), the SFP solver was within 3% of the optimal value.
0 5 10 15 20
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Iteration
Ra
tio
 o
f S
FP
 va
lue
 to
 th
e 
op
tim
al 
va
lue
Figure 2: For each iteration, the average (over sixty independent runs with random initial solutions)
ratio of best value found by SFP to the optimal value is plotted. The error bars surrounding each
value correspond to +1 and -1 standard deviations.
We also compared SFP performance with a one-step lookahead heuristic (see Section 6.3 of
[1]). In fact, we gave this heuristic a significant (unfair) advantage by implementing it for the
optimal plant capacitym∗ as found earlier by backward recursion. In state (t, (i,m∗)), this heuristic
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prescribes a decision that solves
max
(p,x,z)∈F (t,(i,m∗))
(
rt((i,m∗), (p, x, z)) +
∑
lk∈L
∑
Dj(·)∈D
PlkQj V˜t+1(i+ xˆ− zˆ,m∗)
)
, (34)
where V˜t+1 is an approximation of Vt+1 in (20) given by
V˜t+1(i,m∗) , i× min
Dj(·)∈D
D−1j (i) (35)
for all i. That is, the value of inventory left at the end of period t is assumed to equal the revenue
generated by selling that inventory at the lowest possible price.
We tested this heuristic on the fly using simulations. That is, problem (34) is solved, and the
corresponding decision is implemented, only in states visited in a discrete-event simulation that
samples price-demand functions and plant reliability values from their respective distributions,
starting with zero initial inventory. We averaged the profits obtained in 10,000 such independent
simulations to estimate the total expected profit generated by the one-step lookahead heuristic
over periods 1, 2, . . . , T . This estimate was only about 93% of the optimal value (recall in contrast
from above that SFP values are on average 99% of the optimal). In addition, we ran 10,000 such
simulations using a policy prescribed by SFP. A paired t-test showed that the difference between
profits generated by the one-step lookahead heuristic and by SFP was statistically significant.
6 Conclusions and directions for future research
The main contribution of this paper is in showing rigorously how SFP, a game theoretic learning
paradigm that has recently been successful in approximately solving other discrete optimization
problems, can be applied to multi-action stochastic DPs. This is a class of stochastic sequential
decision problems where the decision in each system state is an n-dimensional vector. These
problems suffer from the curse of action-space dimensionality, because the effort needed for solving
the Bellman’s equation in each system state is exponential in n.
Our approach begins by viewing multi-action stochastic DPs as games of common interests
among n players, each corresponding to one component of the decision vectors. Thus player i’s
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pure strategy determines the ith component of the n-dimensional decision vector in each state. In
each iteration of our simplified implementation of SFP, each player solves a best response problem
where the pure strategies of the other players are fixed. Consequently, each of these best response
problems is a DP with a one-dimensional action-space, and hence can be solved efficiently. This
implies that whereas the computational effort required for exact solution of the original multi-action
stochastic DP is exponential in n, the computational work done in a fixed number of SFP iterations
is linear in n.
SFP’s efficiency was demonstrated through numerical experiments on a case study from manu-
facturing. This manufacturing problem was a constrained multi-action stochastic DP. Specifically,
(some of) the components of the multi-dimensional decision vectors were linked by coupling con-
straints and hence the DP did not have the Cartesian product structure that is essential for imple-
menting SFP. We overcame this hurdle by developing a variable transformation that converted the
constrained multi-action stochastic DP into an unconstrained one. SFP was then able to find near-
optimal solutions hundreds of times faster than backward recursion. SFP also found significantly
better solutions as compared to a one-step lookahead heuristic.
While we have laid a basic foundation for applying SFP to multi-action stochastic DPs, several
open questions remain unanswered. These will provide directions for future research as we outline
next.
6.1 Future research directions
Corollary 4.3 only guarantees convergence to the set of locally optimal policies. It is desirable to be
able to strengthen this result and say that SFP converges to the set of optimal policies for multi-
action stochastic DPs. However, such a strengthening does not appear possible at least with the
standard version of SFP that was used in this paper. This limitation stems from the well-known fact
that SFP may not in general converge to optimal Nash equilibria of games of common interests [16].
A more practically relevant question is whether the objective value of the best solution sampled
by SFP converges to the optimal objective value. Unfortunately, even this weaker result does not
hold for games of common interests. It is possible, however, to achieve this weaker but practically
relevant form of convergence by implementing a “noisy” version of SFP where, in iteration k, each
player randomly samples a policy with probability k and samples from the empirical frequency of
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best responses as in Algorithm 4.1 with probability 1−k. Then, if k → 0 at a rate such that every
pure joint strategy is sampled infinitely often with probability one as k →∞, it is easy to see that
the objective value of the best policy sampled will converge to the optimal objective value. There
has been a growing interest in such variants of SFP [8, 11, 20, 21, 30]. We leave their convergence
analyses and computational comparisons in the specific context of multi-action stochastic DPs to
future research.
To the best of our knowledge, all implementations of SFP, including the one in Section 5 in this
paper, have used samples of size one, that is, Nk = 1. While this is a significant deviation from
theory, it has proven adequate in efficiently finding good quality solutions in numerical experiments
on static as well as dynamic optimization problems [8, 12, 17]. Using larger values of Nk in an
SFP implementation leads to a better approximation of the expected value calculation in FP and
also to a better exploration of the policy space, but it makes the best response computation more
demanding. Compare, for instance, the simple best response DP (13) for Nk = 1 with the somewhat
more clumsy best response DP (38) for Nk > 1. We did perform some exploratory numerical
experiments with Nk = 2, 3, 4, 5 but found that Nk = 1 in fact achieved slightly better objective
values. In the future, it would be interesting to numerically investigate this tradeoff using several
values of Nk for various multi-action stochastic DPs.
As demonstrated in our manufacturing case study, onto transformations that map infeasible so-
lutions into feasible ones significantly expand the applicability of our SFP algorithm to constrained
multi-action stochastic DPs. For example, a simple transformation that converts the constrained
multi-action stochastic DP formulation of a class of dynamic resource allocation problems into an
unconstrained multi-action stochastic DP is described in Appendix B. While it is essentially always
possible as stated in Section 2 to convert a constrained problem into an unconstrained one using
a trivial onto transformation, we believe that effective transformations will need to be problem
specific and may require some trial-and-error. Intuitively, “nondegenerate” transformations where
componentwise variations in the constrained problem produce comparable componentwise varia-
tions in the unconstrained problem, are likely to work well. When the linking constraints define
a full-dimensional, well-rounded (the ratio of the radii of a circumscribed and an inscribed ball is
not too large) convex set in a Euclidean space and the feasible decision vectors in the constrained
multi-action stochastic DP are given by the intersection of this convex set with the integer grid, one
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possibility could be to use proportional projection and rounding. Its rough schematic is shown in
Figure 3. Future research will investigate the viability of such transformations and their impact on
the quality of solutions delivered by SFP for different classes of constrained multi-action stochastic
DPs.
A
E
B
D
C
F
Figure 3: A schematic of projection and rounding when the feasible decision vectors are given by
integer grid points inside a convex set. The bounding box grid represents the Cartesian product
A(st). E is an arbitrary but fixed feasible point known to the decision maker. The infeasible grid
point B is first projected to point D such that the length ratios (BE/AE) and (DE/CE) are equal.
Then point D is rounded to the feasible point F .
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A Formulation of a dynamic resource allocation problem as an
unconstrained multi-action stochastic DP
We first provide a detailed description of a typical dynamic resource allocation problem. An initial
amount M > 0 of one resource is available at the beginning of the first period. A random amount
bt ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . . , B} of this resource arrives at the beginning of period t, for t = 2, . . . , T . The
probability mass function of bt is qt(·). State st denotes the amount of resource available at the
beginning of period t, and hence s1 = M . Thus, for t = 2, 3, . . . , T , the state space St equals
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{0, 1, 2, . . . ,M + (t − 1)B}. The cost of storing an amount st of the resource at the beginning
of period t, for t = 2, 3, . . . , T + 1, is given by ht(st), where ht(·) are the holding cost functions.
The decision maker observes the amount of resource available and chooses positive integer levels
a1, a2, . . . , an at which to perform n heterogeneous activities. Let c1t > 0, c2t > 0, . . . , cnt > 0
denote the amounts of the resource consumed in period t by each unit level of activities 1, 2, . . . , n,
respectively. Let Ait(st) = {0, 1, 2, . . . , bst/citc}, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Here bst/citc is the level at
which activity i could be performed if all st units of the resource were allocated to this activity.
Let At(st) = A1t(st)×A2t(st)× . . .×Ant(st). The set of feasible activity levels is then defined by
Ft(st) = {(a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ A(st) : c1ta1 + c2ta2 + . . .+ cntan ≤ st}.
The reward obtained on performing the n activities at levels a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Ft(st) in period t is
given by γt(st, a), where γt(·, ·) is the reward function. After performing these activities, the state
transitions into st+1 = st − (c1ta1 + c2ta2 + . . . + cntan) + bt+1 with probability qt+1(bt+1). Thus
the expected net reward accrued in period t is given by
rt(st, a) = γt(st, a)−
B∑
bt+1=0
qt+1(bt+1)ht+1(st − (c1ta1 + c2ta2 + . . .+ cntan) + bt+1).
The decision maker’s goal is to choose a resource allocation policy, that is, to choose activity levels
in each possible state in each period, so as to maximize the total expected net reward accrued in
periods 1 through T . This problem is clearly a constrained multi-action stochastic DP.
This constrained problem can be converted into an unconstrained multi-action stochastic DP as
follows. Instead of choosing decision vectors a ∈ Ft(st), the decision maker chooses decision vectors
x ∈ At(st). We define transformations Ωt,st : At(st)→ Ft(st) such that Ωt,st(x) = y, where
y =
(⌊
stx1
max(c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn, st)
⌋
,
⌊
stx2
max(c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn, st)
⌋
, . . . ,⌊
stxn
max(c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn, st)
⌋)
.
Notice that if x ∈ Ft(st), then c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn ≤ st and hence max(c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+
cntxn, st) = st. As a result, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have stximax(c1tx1+c2tx2+...+cntxn,st) =
stxi
st
= xi.
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On the other hand, if x ∈ At(st) \Ft(st), then max(c1tx1+ c2tx2+ . . .+ cntxn, st) = c1tx1+ c2tx2+
. . .+ cntxn. Thus,
c1ty1 + . . .+ cntyn = c1t
⌊
stx1
c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn
⌋
+ . . .+ cnt
⌊
stxn
c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn
⌋
≤ stc1tx1
c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn
+ . . .+
stcntxn
c1tx1 + c2tx2 + . . .+ cntxn
= st.
In summary, the transformations Ωt,st do not alter feasible decision vectors but convert infeasible
decision vectors into feasible ones. The former implies that these transformations are onto. If the
decision maker chooses vector x ∈ At(st), the system transitions into st+1 = st−(c1t[Ωt,st(x)]1+. . .+
cnt[Ωt,st(x)]n)+bt+1 with probability qt+1(bt+1). We also extend the domain of the reward function
γt(·, ·) from St × Ft(st) to St × At(st) by defining γt(st, x) = γt(st,Ωt,st(x)) for all x ∈ At(st)
and for all st ∈ St. Owing to the onto property of our transformations Ωt,st , it is easy to see
as in Lemma 3.1 that if an allocation policy is optimal to the unconstrained problem then the
corresponding transformed policy is optimal to the constrained problem. Consequently, it suffices
to solve the unconstrained problem to which the SFP algorithm described in this paper applies in
a straightforward manner.
B Best response DP when the sample size Nk > 1
Consider the best response problem (11) for player i in Algorithm 4.1. For each aggregate pure
joint strategy ξ−i ∈ Ψ−i of all players other than player i, let κk−i(ξ−i) = {j : ψjk−i = ξ−i}. That is,
κk−i(ξ−i) is the set of samples (out of the Nk samples drawn in iteration k) in which players other
than player i sample ξ−i. Interpret fˆk−i(ξ−i) =
|κk−i(ξ−i)|
Nk
as the probability with which players other
than player i play the pure joint strategy ξ−i. Player i’s best response problem (11) can then be
rewritten as
ψki = argmax
ψi∈Ψi
∑
ξ−i∈Ψ−i
|κk−i(ξ−i)|
Nk
U(ψi, ξ−i) = argmax
ψi∈Ψi
∑
ξ−i∈Ψ−i
fˆk−i(ξ−i)U(ψi, ξ−i) (36)
= argmax
ψi∈Ψi
VΘ(ψi,fˆk−i)
(s1). (37)
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Also let λ−it(st, a−i; fˆk−i) be the probability that aggregate action a−i ∈ A−i(st) is chosen in state
st ∈ St in period t by the aggregate player who employs mixed strategy fˆk−i. That is,
λ−it(st, a−i; fˆk−i) =
∑
{ξ−i∈Ψ−i:ξ−it(st)=a−i}
fˆk−i(ξ−i).
Then problem (36) can be interpreted as follows. At the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, . . . , T ,
player i observes the state st ∈ St of the system and chooses a decision ai ∈ Ai(st). The system
then transitions into a state st+1 ∈ St+1 with probability qkit(st+1; st, ai) that is given by
qkit(st+1; st, ai) =
∑
a−i∈A−i(st)
pt(st+1; st, (ai, a−i))λ−it(st, a−i; fk−i),
and player i receives an expected reward that equals
∑
a−i∈A−i(st)
λ−it(st, a−i; fk−i)rt(st, (ai, a−i)).
Player i’s goal is to maximize the total T -period expected reward it accrues starting in the initial
state s1. Problem (36) can therefore be formulated as a standard finite-horizon stochastic DP
and can be solved through the following Bellman’s equations for all st ∈ St in the order t =
T, T − 1, . . . , 1:
V kit (st) = max
ai∈Ai(st)
{ ∑
a−i∈A−i(st)
λ−it(st, a−i; fk−i)rt(st, (ai, a−i))+
∑
st+1∈St+1
qkit(st+1; st, ai)V
k
it+1(st+1)
}
, (38)
where V kiT+1(sT+1) = 0 for all sT+1 ∈ ST+1. Actions ai that achieve the above maxima define a
best response policy ψki for player i, which can then be employed to perform a belief update.
References
[1] D P Bertsekas. Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, volume 1 and 2. Athena Scientific,
Nashua, NH, third edition, 2007.
[2] R I Brafman and M Tennenholtz. Learning to coordinate efficiently: A model-based approach.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 19:11–23, 2003.
29
[3] G W Brown. Iterative solution of games by fictitious play. In Activity Analysis of Production
and Allocation. Wiley, 1951.
[4] E Campos-Nanez, A Garcia, and C Li. A game theoretic approach to efficient power manage-
ment in sensor networks. Operations Research, 56(3):552–561, 2008.
[5] H S Chang, M C Fu, J Hu, and S I Marcus. Sampling-based algorithms for Markov decision
processes. Springer-Verlag, London, UK, 2007.
[6] X D Chen and D Simchi-Levi. Coordinating inventory control and pricing strategies with ran-
dom demand and fixed ordering costs: the finite horizon case. Operations Research, 52(6):887–
896, 2004.
[7] S F Cheng, M A Epelman, and R L Smith. CoSIGN: A parallel algorithm for coordinated
traffic signal control. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 7(4):551–564,
2006.
[8] M A Epelman, A Ghate, and R L Smith. Sampled Fictitious Play for approximate dynamic
programming. Computers and Operations Research, 38:1705–1718, 2011.
[9] A A Federgruen and A Heching. Combined pricing and inventory control under uncertainty.
Operations Research, 47(3):454–475, 1999.
[10] D Fudenberg and J Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.
[11] A Garcia, S D Patek, and K Sinha. A decentralized approach to discrete optimization via
simulation: application to network flows. Operations Research, 55(4):717–732, 2007.
[12] A Garcia, D Reaume, and R L Smith. Fictitious play for finding system optimal routings in
dynamic traffic networks. Transportation Research Part B, 34:147–156, 2000.
[13] G Infanger. Dynamic asset allocation strategies using a stochastic dynamic programming ap-
proach. In S A Zenios and W T Ziemba, editors, Handbook of Asset and Liability Management,
volume 1, pages 200–251. Elsevier, 2006.
[14] S Kirkpatrick and C D Gelatt. Optimization by simulated annealing. Science, 220:671–680,
1983.
30
[15] L Y Koo, Y Chen, A Adhitya, R Srinivasan, and I A Karimi. Evaluating refinery supply
chain policies and investment decisions through simulation-optimization. In Proceedings of the
Winter Simulation Conference, 2006.
[16] T J Lambert, M A Epelman, and R L Smith. A fictitious play approach to large-scale opti-
mization. Operations Research, 53(3):477–489, 2005.
[17] T J Lambert and H Wang. Fictitious play approach to a mobile unit situation awareness
problem. Technical report, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, 2003.
[18] C Maglaras. Revenue management for a multiclass single-server queue via a fluid model
analysis. Operations Research, 54(5):914–932, 2006.
[19] C Maglaras and J Meissner. Dynamic pricing strategies for multiproduct revenue management
problems. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 8(2):136–148, 2006.
[20] J R Marden, G Arslan, and J S Shamma. Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential
games. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 54(2):208–220, 2009.
[21] J R Marden, H P Young, G Arslan, and J S Shamma. Payoff-based dynamics for multiplayer
weakly acyclic games. SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 48(1):373–396, 2009.
[22] D Monderer and L Shapley. Fictitious play property for games with identical interests. Journal
of Economic Theory, 68:258–265, 1996.
[23] W Powell. Approximate Dynamic Programming. John Wiley and Sons, New Jersy, 2007.
[24] M Puterman. Markov Decision Processes. John Wiley and Sons, New Jersy, 1994.
[25] J Robinson. An iterative method of solving a game. Annals of Mathematics, 54:296–301, 1951.
[26] S M Ross. Introduction to stochastic dynamic programming. Academic Press, New York, 1983.
[27] E Sisikoglu. Distributed algorithms based on fictitious play for near optimal sequential decision
making. PhD thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, 2009.
[28] R S Sutton and A G Barto. Reinforcement learning: an introduction. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USA, 1998.
31
[29] K T Talluri and G van Ryzin. The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management. Springer,
New York, 2005.
[30] H P Young. Evolution of conventions. Econometrica, 61(1):57–84, 1993.
32
